Frege considered language to function much like mathematics. He believed that we can describe things in natural language so that they are reducible to atomic sentences that are very similar to functions with variables. Frege goes into more detail to allow language to describe things that exist in the world by presenting clarifications between sense and reference. For Frege, names refer to objects, being very similar to numbers in functions that refer to exact values. Predicates are functional expressions and concepts. Nouns and predicates cannot be complete by themselves; they must be used together to refer to things effectively. Predicates by themselves only refer to functions, but with a noun attached they refer to concepts. However, it seems that Frege believes that proper names express something else, which I will refer to later. For Frege, there are ordinary names associated with things and descriptions of things with proper names. Atomic sentences have truth values ​​that evaluate the application of a concept to a referenced object. To find what the sentence refers to, you need to apply the referent of the predicate to the referent of the subject. Connectives are words like “and,” “if,” and “not” that are functions from truth values ​​to truth tables. Each of these provides the basis for Frege's linguistic system such that we are able to speak in our ordinary language, but still retain the mathematical connection he initially attempts to establish. Frege's use of language and sentences as functions with variables is consistent with how he defines the basic constructs of what is needed in a human language. The referent of each of these elements is supposed to move Frege towards the resolution of a fundamental problem... .center of paper......t every person sees. This is the meaning of the word: the two people can exchange telescopes and discover (or see again) the Moon that is presented to them. The way it is presented may be different, but the Moon that appears in the world is always the same. Finally there are the images of the Moon found on the retinas of observers. This is the actual conception or idea of ​​the word that cannot be shared between the two people, no matter how hard they may try. Although we can both see the same object through the same mode of presentation, the idea that I have of the word will be completely different from the idea that another person may have of the same word. It is important to know that when Frege says sense, he is not talking about the individual conception or idea. The telescope analogy does a great job of describing why this is the case.