On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. To date, this has been a controversial military strategy. Those who believe the United States was justified in using the atomic bomb argue that more lives were saved and that the Japanese vigor and willingness to fight to the death forced the United States to extreme measures. On the other hand, those who thought that the use of the atomic bomb was unjustified argue that the atomic bomb violated the principles of warfare, that it did not end World War II (WWII) sooner, and that it was not the ideal choice to use for World War II. Considering supporters of the use of the atomic bomb by the United States such as Hugh A. Halliday and Richard Frank, military historians, and Michael Kort, professor of social sciences at Boston University, as well as opponents including political analyst John Siebert, Martin J Sherwin, Professor at George Mason University, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of California, we intend to evaluate and summarize both sides of the argument over whether the United States was justified in dropping the atomic bomb. We say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay Proponents of using the atomic bomb argue that if the atomic bomb had not been dropped and the original land invasion had been implemented, more lives on both sides would have been lost. Japan's reluctance to surrender forced the United States to the point that they didn't know what it would take to end the war. To discuss these points, we will examine the arguments of Hugh A. Halliday, a military historian who has served on the RCAF's Air Historian, the Canadian Forces Directorate of History, and the Canadian War Museum, Michael Kort, professor of social sciences at Boston University, and Richard B. Frank, a military historian who served nearly four years in the United States Army. Japan had a deep-seated belief that the purpose of life was to die for the Emperor, which was seen not only in its militants but also in its civilians with civilian casualties ranging from 42,000 to 150,000 deaths by suicide or battle. A land invasion of the Japanese islands was an option considered by the United States government. However, General Douglas MacArthur's estimates, favoring the land invasion, limited the number to around 130,000 casualties; however, this did not include the 300,000 Allied prisoners of war (PoW) nor enemy civilian casualties. In addition to the ground invasion and bombing, the United States planned to use a blockade that was expected to cause famine, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths. Although approximately 200,000 people were killed by the atomic bomb, it was still the morally preferred choice over the estimated deaths due to an invasion. However, Michael Kort argues that it was never about deciding to use the atomic bomb instead of implementing a ground invasion, but rather what it would take to make Japan surrender. The United States had been bombing Japan for three years before the Potsdam Declaration. It had already suffered approximately 806,000 casualties in Okinawa and Tokyo. Yet, when the United States signed the Potsdam Declaration that gave Japan the option to surrender, it not only chose to ignore it, but also sought negotiations with the Soviet Union, to the extent that benefits accrued from the contractual alliance. Therefore, the United States hoped for the sheer destructive power of the atomic bombcould persuade Japan to surrender and thus end the Second World War. Was the United States justified in using the atomic bomb? violation of the principles of war and of the Geneva Protocol, which prohibited the use of chemical weapons in war. Furthermore, in response to the belief that the atomic bomb would shorten the duration of World War II, the reason Japan surrendered was due to the USSR declaring war on it and the invasion of Japanese-occupied lands. Furthermore, if the United States had amended the Potsdam Declaration, Japan would have been more inclined to accept its terms. To explore these topics, we will discuss the points of John Siebert, a policy analyst who has served in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Human Rights and Aboriginal Justice at the United Church of Canada, as well as a consultant to government and non-government organizations. organizations, Martin J. Sherwin, Pulitzer Prize winner and professor of history at George Mason University, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, professor emeritus of history at the University of California. There are probably principles of warfare that are commonly agreed upon, such as not directly targeting nonmilitary institutions and nonmilitants. However, the United States consciously targeted the civilian cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And if Henry L. Stimson, former American Secretary of War, had not opposed the Objective Committee, they would have chosen Kyoto, the center of Japanese civilization for over a thousand years. Furthermore, after the practice of mustard gas and other chemical weapons during World War I, the Geneva Protocol was created and signed by members of the League of Nations, which prohibited the use of chemical weapons in warfare. But although the United States was aware of the radiation poisoning that would result from the atomic bomb, it was still deployed. By exploiting the atomic bomb, the United States indicated that nuclear weapons were valid weapons of war. Aside from moral discretion in the implementation of the atomic bomb, the argument that the atomic bomb first brought about the end of World War II is invalid. Since the USSR declared war on Japan and invaded Japanese-controlled territory, Japan could not ensure success in the fight on both fronts and therefore surrendered. Ward Wilson, Senior Fellow and Director of Re-thinking Nuclear Weapons, noted that Japanese leaders claimed that it was the atomic bomb that led to their surrender because it was less embarrassing to lose to a wonder weapon. Not only that, but Japanese military officials argued that they could convince the USSR to negotiate better surrender terms than the unconditional surrender stipulated in the Potsdam Declaration. However, with the declaration of war, they no longer had any reason to continue the war. In addition to this, the United States had amended its Potsdam Declaration to indicate that the Emperor would not be held responsible for the war in the event of an unconditional surrender, then perhaps Japan would agree. This is because his deadline for surrender was to preserve their imperial system and Japan was already known for holding its emperor to a high rank. Although Secretary of War Stimson recommended this adjustment; unfortunately, the Secretary of State, James Byrnes, vetoed it. Even if the amendment was attempted but vetoed, the United States could have invited the USSR to sign the Potsdam Declaration, doing so would have demonstrated to Japan that it could not rely on the USSR to help it. Supporters of the use of the atomic bomb argue that the bomb saved more lives than the planned ground invasion and, becauseof Japan's reluctance to surrender to the war despite highly unfavorable odds, pushed the United States to submit to drastic measures. The willingness of the Japanese people to die for their emperor was disturbing and led to a high number of civilian casualties even before the idea of ​​dropping the atomic bomb was considered. This temperament of dying rather than being captive is one of the teachings of bushido, a samurai legacy and code of ethics. The Japanese were taught bushido and to worship the Emperor, a descendant of the Sun Goddess, from a young age. Because of this disdain for being prisoners of war, many times the Japanese would fight until they were killed or they committed suicide. American soldiers would witness the horror of Japanese mothers holding their children in their arms and choosing to leap to their deaths rather than be taken prisoner. The United States estimated that a land invasion would not only lead to casualties for the Allied powers but also to a high casualty rate due to the extreme devotion the Japanese had towards their emperor. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that the United States would suffer 1.2 million casualties for the entire land invasion operation, while Department of the Navy personnel estimated 1.7-4 million casualties (Trueman). These estimates were significantly larger than the approximately 200,000 people killed by the atomic bomb. Unknown at the time, it was later discovered that the Japanese military had trained a civilian militia of approximately 28 million men and women to defend the home islands in case a land invasion occurred (Giangreco). A year after the dropping of the atomic bomb, Karl T. Compton, a member of the Interim Truman Committee - "a committee to advise the President on matters relating to the use of nuclear energy and weapons" (Harry S Truman National Historic Site ) – interviewed a Japanese Army officer asking if they could have repelled Operation Downfall to which the officer replied "... I don't think we could have stopped you." When asked what the Japanese would do, the officer replied, “We would continue to fight until all the Japanese were killed, but we would not be defeated,” where defeat meant the disgrace of surrender (Compton). the Japanese imperial system was corrupted by the influence of military officers who strongly desired to continue fighting despite the extremely damaging situation the country found itself in. Despite suffering 806,000 casualties in Okinawa and Tokyo, when the United States issued the Potsdam Declaration, Japan chose to try to invoke help from the USSR, which had a delicate relationship with the United States. And after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and given a three-day grace period to respond, key Japanese military officials found it unlikely that the United States would have another bomb. Even when Nagasaki was bombed, military officials refused to accept the surrender, although the Emperor now suggested accepting the United States' terms. It was only after days of continuous bombing following the use of atomic bombs that the Emperor firmly declared that Japan would indeed surrender in the war. So while there may have been implications for the Japanese to surrender, it was unlikely that they would surrender given the obstinacy of the military. principles of war, but also legitimized the use of the atomic bomb in future wars. Although the United States targeted civilian cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, these cities were chosen because they focused on military production (“Hiroshima and Nagasaki Death.