The unfair prejudice claim has always been considered as the simpler and more flexible option for the protection of minority shareholders compared to the statutory derivative action. The restrictive leave requirements under the statutory derivative application where the concept of prima facie, good faith and ratification have been interpreted within the confines of the origins in the case of Foss v Harbottle do not add any appeal to the statutory derivative application. Furthermore, the rather limited approach in relation to the granting of compensation costs orders in no way encourages any potential claimant to pursue a derivative action. Recent cases allowing for corporate relief through an unfair injury claim and even the ability to recover costs under an unfair injury claim have further relegated the significance of the derivative action. This essay will look at the root cause of the demise of the derivative claim which is the ability to obtain business compensation and even costs through an unfair injury claim, compensation and order that were initially only available through a derivative action. Furthermore this essay will discuss how the lines should be drawn between statutory derivative action and unfair prejudice and what restrictions should be added to the remedy against unfair prejudice under section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 so that the meaning of derivative action legal can be restored. The distinction between an unfair prejudice claim and a statutory derivative action has always been in the nature of the relief sought by the claimant. This is probably where a distinction arises as to whether a statutory derivative action or an unfair prejudice claim should be pursued. A d...... middle of paper...... It is disappointing that Lord Scott did not take this opportunity to endorse the criteria set out in the Re Chime Corp Ltd case and did not even provide further guidance on when the should be exercised the power of the courts under section 994. Cheung argued that Lord Scott's reference in Gamlestaden is still a summary of the principles derived from Re Chime Corp. It is argued that reading the Gamlestaden case as it stands does not states no criteria for allowing corporate relief in a petition for unfair injury, but rather the decision just approved that the court “may make such order as it deems appropriate to provide relief in relation to the matters complained of” in a petition for unfair prejudice. This may be a cautious approach so as not to limit the court's ability to make the order it sees fit which would not be available if a test were introduced.