To paraphrase the quote attributed to Trotsky, “We may not be interested in the insurrection, but the insurrection is interested in us.” The United States faces this dilemma. The question remains of how to prepare for all this, amidst competing interests and threats. The U.S. military should prepare for both conventional and irregular warfare by prioritizing conventional warfare, recognizing irregular warfare as the most significant short-term threat to national interests and conventional warfare as the most threatening long-term. This paper will compare considerations for these types of warfare, explain why the United States should prioritize conventional operations as it prepares for both, and describe short- and long-term threats to national interests. Before examining the priorities and strategic challenges recommended by the United States, a discussion of definitions and current strategy is appropriate. Irregular warfare can be defined as a “violent struggle between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over affected populations,” in contrast to conventional warfare – a conflict between two or more states with conventional weapons in open confrontation. Warfare in the 21st century thus far marks the transition to more irregular forms. However, the long term is more uncertain. Major US strategic military documents highlight irregular warfare. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guide, titled “Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” lists 10 priority missions in a “broad, not rigid” order of priority. Note that the first mission listed is “anti-terrorism and irregular warfare”. The 2014 QDR places these priorities in a broader strategic framework with three pillars: protect the homeland, build global security and… middle of paper… eland. Hoffman would agree, while arguing that it is best to prepare for anything: “In the long term, I would argue that we need to maintain the ability to conduct successful campaigns against both large conventionally armed states and their militaries, and against widely dispersed terrorists – and against everything else." In conclusion, preparing for conventional and irregular warfare is challenging, particularly when developing a national strategy and considering resources. Colin Gray rightly points out that strategic force planning has two cardinal rules, prudence and adaptability, a lesson that can be useful in this situation. The U.S. military should prepare for both conventional and irregular warfare, giving priority to conventional warfare. This requires an examination of short-term irregular threats in addition to long-term conventional warfare threats.