States that for S to know that p, S must believe that p. Simply put, someone knows something, if that something is true. And, once again, as discussed above, it is a necessary condition. Since the theory states that this condition must be present for there to be knowledge. However, there is an obvious potential problem with this condition, or rather, what is meant by “believes”. An aspect of psychological repression: repressed memory can be considered a counterexample to this condition. In this example, there appears to be knowledge of something without a “belief” in the event. If I were in a car accident, and I was aware that I had been in a car accident, and I know that there is a certain degree of danger in car accidents. Yet I managed to emerge unscathed and not “believe” that there was danger in my situation. The enormity of the situation has not yet “hit” me, even though I am aware of what has happened. However, the fact that I later refuse to drive the car suggests that I was more or less aware of the danger, even if I chose not to talk about it with myself. So in this case the counterexample simply speaks to my degree of consciousness in the situation. Which is not particularly relevant to the definition of the theory in question. The theory presupposes, with some certainty, that one has some form of faith in the given situation, it does not have to consider the multiple states of awareness and consciousness that extend (but arguably never break) the limits of what it is to know , but at the same time no