In the excerpt from Mancur Olson's classic work “The Logic of Collective Action”, in the Kernell/Smith Reader, the author explores the levels of difficulty places in coordinating collective action to achieve common goals. Furthermore, because politics is the process through which individuals and groups reach collective agreements and take collective action, the community supports decision-making and political action through cooperation. The main obstacle is the free rider problem that emerges due to the inherent weakness of group dynamics. In each unit, a person or a minority actively participates, contributes and supports the existence of the group. However, all members reap the benefits. While sharing common interests, free riders inhibit common action. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay The next issue is due to the scope or size of the group. Olson argues that, in any case, universal participation still limits common action because divergence of opinion and disparate interests only lead to cacophony. Consequently, disunity is defined by the inability to reach consensus. Indeed, this contentious climate hinders collective decision-making and cooperative efforts. On the other hand, unanimity can also place an excessive burden on a country or organization's resources, as evidenced by the nationalization of public policies in the USO. Olson emphasizes the final siege, the nature of what is at stake for the common goods of the community. Common or public goods indicate the production of most municipalities and government enterprises. Some common goods to consider are water, sunlight, air, education, government goods and services. Of course, common interest is defined as the unifying concerns that hold the group together. There are no interests or vested interests in common goods or public goods. True commons are non-rival (one individual's use of a good or service does not compromise another's supply) and non-excludable (one cannot prevent another's use or enjoyment). Consequently, the lack of specific incentives and the assumption of a universal benefit for the commons hinders action. Overall, deducing from the above arguments, Olson advocates collective action and the political power of small numbers, overturning previous political thinking about the tyranny of the majority. His observations are based on the real threat posed by a powerful minority involved in politics. Unlike giant cooperatives, small groups benefit from their ability to agree, associate, mobilize and execute quickly. The result is that powerful minorities often dominate in negotiation processes and even override larger representative bodies. Olson launches into a vivid analysis of a case study in which, ironically, not-so-common interests materialize. Monopolies that own disproportionate shares and fewer stakeholders compete more efficiently and progress more quickly as politicians show more solidarity with private lobbies. Olson's unconventional findings run counter to the popular belief that within a democracy, the will of the majority crushes the minority. resource sharing, distribution, political decision making, policy making and the successful transition of lobbying to public benefit. Comparing the operations of small and large groups, despite their ideals to realize common interests, the clear difference lies.