Plato and Aristotle both reject the moral relativism of the Sophists and address the question of how man can achieve absolute virtue. In the Republic Plato constructs a proof of existence, a kallipolis that produces philosopher-kings who grasp the eternal Good and govern with benevolence. Aristotle discusses kallipolis at length in the Politics, but much of his criticism is of implementation. However, Aristotle makes at least one worthy criticism of the theory, accusing Plato of inappropriately abusing holism in evaluating the happiness of the state. But even Aristotle fails to solve the basic problem of guaranteeing complete happiness for all individuals; he ultimately constructs a political theory fundamentally similar to that of Plato. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay Plato postulates a tripartite soul with appetitive, lively, and rational parts, corresponding to the producers, guardians, and rulers in the kallipolis (The Republic 435c-441c). Such a construction poses an apparent internal inconsistency. The guardian class, for example, may only represent the spiritual part, but individual guardians still possess all three parts of the soul. The inconsistency disappears if the kallipolis serves exclusively as a macrocosm of the soul, since a part of the soul has only that part of the soul. But a kallipolis qua polis must resolve the question of how a vibrant class can be composed of members who also possess desires and rationality. Plato defends his conception of the three classes by appealing to the idea of ​​specialization of labor. He asks, "[Does a person do a better job if he practices many trades or---since he is himself a person---if he practices one?" (370b). He adopts this economic principle for his kallipolis, assigning to each inhabitant that function for which he is most naturally suited (423d). In other words, Plato claims that producers should accept toil and pursue physical desires without needing significant mental edification, while more rational souls should live an ascetic life. In this framework, it is logical that Plato denies money, property, and even travel to guardians (419). In order for guardians to achieve the greatest courage and glory as their lively souls demand, they must specialize and avoid distractions. But the idea of ​​work specialization implies that some activities are practiced to the detriment of others. If Plato selects and cultivates the part of the soul that will provide the greatest benefit to the kallipolis, Adeimantus can argue that Plato practices the relative suppression of the other two parts, if they exist. Guardians, for example, must be weaned from appetitive desires (419). Adeimantus fears that such inhibition will cause unhappiness. After all, Plato discourages guardians from taking ordinary pleasures such as property (416-17). Adeimantus essentially emphasizes that human nature, as defined by Plato himself, contains innate needs of things. It questions Plato's implicit assumption that a suitable environment, expressed by social laws, can overcome such innate inclinations and change these desires towards better and higher goals. If Plato were to label the kallipolis as theoretical and not subject to pragmatic concerns, the question of how tripartite souls give rise to city segments that behave according to only one part of the soul would disappear. Guardians, under the influence of the law, would let go of physical desires, a change that would allow them to achieve the greatest degree of happiness possible. But Plato expresses his practical concerns whenstates: "We will say that it would not be surprising if these people were happier as they are, but that in founding our city, we do not aim to make any group extraordinarily happy, but to make the whole city so, as far as possible" (420b ) Plato admits that the guardianssacrifice at least one component of their happiness, since they are happier in their original condition outside the kallipolis. He admits that the appetitive component of the soul cannot be eliminated without affecting happiness happiness of “the whole city” seems vague. Plato means either that holistic happiness exists even if no part of the city is happy, or that decreasing the happiness of the guardians increases the happiness of the other classes and therefore raises the happiness of the entire city. . Here Aristotle makes his main theoretical assault by interpreting Plato has mistakenly postulated a holistic happiness. Aristotle responds: "Although he denies the Guardians even happiness, he maintains that it is the duty of the legislator to make the whole city happy. But it is impossible for the whole to be happy, unless the majority, if not actually all, or at least some parts, possess happiness, because happiness is a very different thing from equality: two odd numbers added together make a number even, but two unhappy sections cannot add up to a happy state. And if the Guardians aren't happy, who will be? Certainly not the specialized workers and the general performance of the mechanics" (The Politics 1264b15). Aristotle here makes two observations, independently verifiable for fairness of treatment compared to what Plato states. His first point maintains that, since happiness is a quality intrinsic, the aggregation of different souls with different discontents cannot produce happiness. This point seems reasonable, but it only partially contrasts with what Plato claims. Perhaps Aristotle was responding negatively to Plato for having made the following analogy: Suppose, then, that someone come up to us while we were painting a statue and object that, because we had painted the eyes (which are the most beautiful part) black instead of purple, we had not applied the most beautiful colors to the most beautiful parts of the statue. We consider it reasonable to offer the following defense: "You shouldn't expect us to paint the eyes so well that they no longer look like eyes, and the same with the other parts. Rather you must look to see whether by treating each part appropriately, we are making the whole statue beautiful." (420c-d) Aristotle makes a valid criticism of Plato in that the latter means that the happiness of a city can be strictly compared to the beauty of a statue. To be beautiful, the statue must be appreciated by the eye of the beholder. Purple eyes would ruin the effect; seeing the statue holistically makes sense from those applied in art galleries. While beauty may be an external state to be seen, happiness is an internal state to be experienced. As Aristotle suggests, happiness cannot be compared to equality, which can result from odd numbers. Rather, the happiness of the city is equal to the sum of the happiness of its parts, Plato, however, proceeds to defend the idea that having one section of the population too happy would ruin the happiness of other sections. Aristotle, perhaps taking up this further Platonic idea, makes the second point: if the guardians are not happy, then the producers cannot be happy either. His claim appears tangential and unsupported. In any case, he misses the real Platonic argument: "You must not force us to give our guardians the kind of happiness that would make them something other than guardians... you will surely see that they will completely destroy the city,simply because they alone have the possibility of governing him well and making him happy" (420d-1a). Plato implicitly argues that guardians who regularly indulge in appetitive pursuits would no longer be guardians, but among common producers. He has a rigorous sense of what a guardian can do lawfully while remaining effective. Furthermore, Plato claims that the question is not so much whether the other classes will be happy if the guardians are not perfectly happy, but whether the guardians are not perfectly happy. as Aristotle accuses, but whether the city can exist if normal pleasures corrupt the guardians . Plato seems to imagine an extremely slippery slope, with the guardians as shepherds and ordinary people as sheep. If shepherds lowered their vigilance and enjoyed materialistic pleasures, the sheep would certainly be taken by the wolves of anarchy. Aristotle does not directly refute Plato on the possibility of such complete deterioration occurring. But in arguing the kallipolis against happiness objections, Plato takes the rather rigid position that even small deviations would destroy the city, and therefore less than complete happiness should be tolerated, since a stable city is happier than total chaos. Therefore, the result emerges that the happiest city cannot contain the maximum number of happy individuals. Although Aristotle does not treat Plato fairly, his criticism points out that individual souls cannot benefit from a mysterious holistic happiness. Without this condition, Plato must resort to his argument that he sacrifices some individual happiness for utilitarian reasons of state preservation. Aristotle recognizes that unhappiness results from the suppression of parts of the soul. He criticizes practices such as sharing women among guardians because it opposes pleasure to the same extent (1262a32). He doesn't see the Platonic slippery slope. But Aristotle, at the same time, argues that a community of wives and children may be suitable for the agricultural class (1262a40). He argues that if producers have fewer affects, they will be more likely to obey their rulers. Aristotle here uses the same logic as Plato: he sacrifices lower forms of contentment for the interests of stability. In other words, he values ​​lack of revolt more than individual happiness=2And Aristotle ultimately rejects the communal sharing of wives and children to include it in his political theory; notes that property and pleasure strengthen the interpersonal bonds that bind the state (1262b3). Unlike Plato, he believes that a maximally stable and good state can be achieved with less extreme measures. In addition to accepting a role for citizens' appetitive desires, Aristotle offers them more space to realize their highest faculty, reason=2E. the virtues of a good citizen and a good man are not the same, for the former possesses only correct opinions and obedience, while the latter has practical wisdom (1277b16). Aristotle emphasizes the role of government, or the employment of practical wisdom, for human virtue and extends the capacity widely for certain constitutions, especially in the political system. Plato, on the other hand, sees government more as a necessity than as something beautiful (540b). As such, Aristotle pays more attention to human nature and sees cases where it can be useful to promote the expression of higher faculties for more people. But it can be argued that Aristotle differs only quantitatively with his view of man and the state, but not qualitatively. . Aristotle does not recognize that everyone, especially slaves, has the full capacity to reason and govern (1255b4). Like Plato, Aristotle has an essentially elitist worldview, in that he believes that most men should not rule.